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Abstract Travel for reproductive health care has become a widespread global phenomenon. 
Within the field, the decision to travel to seek third parties to assist with reproduction is 
widely assumed to be autonomous. However there has been scant research exploring the 
application of the principle of autonomy to the experience of the cross-border traveller. 
Seeking to contribute to the growing, but still small, body of sociological bioethics research, 
this paper maps the application of the ethical principle of autonomy to the lived experience of 
infertile individuals who cross borders for reproductive care. It examines their choices as 
patient, consumer and traveller. It suggests that their experience evidences a contradictory 
autonomy, which offers them both choice and no choice in their final decision to travel. The 
paper argues that this lack of meaningful autonomy is enabled by a medicalised framework of 
infertility which prioritises technology as the cure to infertility. This both shapes expectations 
of infertile individuals and limits their options of family creation. Ultimately, the paper 
suggests that sociology bioethics research shows that the liberatory credentials of technology 
should be questioned, and identifies that this field demands greater scholarly attention.  
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Cheryl (#21) was married in 2010. Over the next four years she underwent 13 rounds of In 
Vitro Fertilisation (IVF). Her doctor(s) advised her to ‘just keep going, there's nothing wrong 
with you, just keep going it will work’. Cheryl underwent ‘multitudes of tests’. Her IVF 
treatments occurred over multiple locations and doctors, and involved moving between 
Australian states to undergo treatments until ‘we got to a point we thought we just can't. 
You've got to be an idiot to keep doing this over and over and over again with the same 
result.’ Through Internet research, reading a textbook by an immunologist, and attending one 
surrogacy conference, Cheryl self-diagnosed that her immune system was ‘killing’ her 
embryo. Cheryl told researchers that ‘in terms of support for surrogacy…I'd said to my 
doctors, “I don't feel like it's the embryos”; I feel like it's the implantations just not working.’ 
Nevertheless, ‘[n]o one ever suggested surrogacy. No one ever said: ‘have you got a sister or 
a friend or’ - no one ever asked that.’ Cheryl travelled to India, which was at that time a legal 
destination for international travellers seeking cross border reproductive care (CBRC), and 
was successful in having a baby by an Indian surrogate using her and her husbands’ gametes, 
at a cost of AU$34,000.  
     Cheryl is a traveller who engaged in CBRC to access reproductive technologies (ARTs), 
surrogacy and related treatments. Cheryl’s narrative reveals three roles or identities of the 
CBRC traveller: (1) a patient consenting to the medical provision of IVF to cure infertility; 
(2) a consumer choosing to locate the best doctor and the right clinic; and (3) a traveller 
accessing the global ART industry. As will be explained, Cheryl’s story is not unique 
amongst travellers seeking CBRC, but neither is it typical. Her story is not unique as, for 
many patients, treatment options are often both physically and mentally arduous, as well as 
expensive and time consuming. Her story is only typical in so far as fertility journeys vary 
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widely in time taken, physical and emotional harm, and money spent.   While Cheryl’s story 
is hers alone, her experiences as a patient, consumer and traveller raise the issue of the extent 
and limits of autonomy shared by all individuals who travel across borders seeking ART.    
     This paper probes the application of the ethical principle of autonomy to the experience of 
infertile individuals seeking CBRC. Autonomy is an important value in reproductive decision 
making because it ensures that individuals make complex decisions which are of their own 
choice, and allows individuals to direct the course of their own life (Farrell et al. 2017; 
Morgan 1998; Nedelsky 1989). Health law prioritises patient autonomy, yet in bioethics little 
attention has been paid to individuals crossing borders to use reproductive health services, 
with even less consideration of their autonomy. The focus of research on health and travel for 
CBRC is generally upon health issues which arise once travel has taken place, such as the 
impact upon donors’ health (Jordan et al. 2004), or the involvement of the local domestic 
professional (Snyder et al. 2013; Millbank 2019). This paper extends this scholarship by 
examining autonomy in the decision making process prior to travel.  
     Through an interview-based qualitative study with individuals who travel, often illegally, 
for CBRC, this paper offers insight into the practical application of the ethical principle of 
autonomy. The study confirms that infertile individuals make choices within a medicalised 
framework which shapes expectations and drives choice in family creation. Our findings 
support assertions made by medical sociologists that medicalisation may lead to a harmful 
loss of control (Morgan 1998: 83-121). This is exemplified in Cheryl’s narrative. Each of her 
experiences across the three sites of patient, consumer and traveller contains an  inherent 
contradiction. Firstly, Cheryl’s consent to infertility treatment as an IVF patient belies the 
reality of the financial, physical and mental harm inflicted upon her by repeated and failed 
medical treatments; secondly, her choice of treatment and clinical practitioner is made 
complex due to territorial and treatment limitations under Australian law, and how such 
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treatment is limited by the business model of fertility clinics; and finally, her ‘independent’ 
decision to travel is made against a backdrop of risk and fear.   
      Discussion of autonomy in ART is increasingly important. Infertility rates are rising 
(FertilitySA 2018), global travel is proliferating (Culley et al. 2011), and ART is normalized 
to such a degree that processes such as oocyte freezing are offered as an ‘insurance’ against 
future infertility. Autonomy also needs to be considered in the context of the harm that occurs 
to both the traveller and to third parties, as well as the financial, physical and mental costs to 
donors and surrogates. A recent study of international literature conducted by Hodson and 
Bewley found a range of incidents of health abuse in ART, including unnecessary medical 
procedures, the absence of a concerted public health campaign regarding infertility, and a 
lack of promotion of alternative ways to start a family, such as intrauterine insemination or 
adoption, leading to couples using ART without first trying conservative measures (Hodsona 
and Bewley 2019). Abuse is also apparent in the Australian ART industry. In March 2019, 
the Minister for Health in the state of Victoria referred an inquiry under section 103 of the 
Health Complaints Act 2016 (Vic) into the provision of ART services. The Terms of 
Reference of the inquiry covers potentially dangerous and unethical practices of ART 
providers, the use of “add-ons” or “adjuvant therapies” not medically proven to be effective, 
and potential misleading and deceptive conduct in relation to advertisement of costs and 
success rates.  
     This paper is part of a growing body of empirical work contributing to bioethical inquiry. 
This paper is not a rights-based argument for reproduction or to travel for CBRC. Instead, it 
uses the actual experience of infertile individuals who have travelled for CBRC to determine 
whether and how external constructs influence the travellers’ autonomous decision-making. 
To begin, I outline the background of ART and CBRC, explain the research study, and note 
its usefulness in the context of sociological bioethics. I then briefly explain the ethical 
5 
 
principle of autonomy and flag its known limits in existing bioethical and feminist 
scholarship in relation to reproductive autonomy. The findings of the research are then 
provided, supporting the view that autonomy in this area is contradictory, as individuals who 
travel for CBRC clearly exercise choice, but are also influenced by external factors which 
may reduce and limit autonomy and ‘push’ Australians overseas for CBRC. In conclusion, I 
urge the reframing of regulation to assist infertile individuals  create families within Australia 
(Pennings et al. 2008). 
 
1.1 Cross Border Reproductive Care (CBRC) and Australians travelling for ART 
 
Reproductive travel typically refers to services involving medically assisted conception, and 
is often framed as a subset of medical tourism or travel to obtain health care. It is a fast-
growing industry, worth more than US$22.3 billion globally (Global Market Insights 2016: 
2016-2023), with dozens of countries emerging as destinations.  
     Terms such as ‘reproductive travel’, ‘fertility tourism’ and ‘holiday’ are used in existing 
literature to reflect an element of choice, depict the travel as a leisurely activity (Speier 
2016), and imply free and easy travel, and individual choice-as-pleasure (Franklin 1997). 
However, these terms are contentious. Some scholars argue that the terms misrepresent the 
risks of cross-border travel, as well as obscure the desperation that informs the choice to cross 
borders for assisted fertility services. Instead, they suggest the use of terms such as 
‘reproductive exile’ (Inhorn and Patrizio 2009), or ‘repro-migration’ (Nahman 2011). In 
recognition of this debate, this paper avoids the use of the term ‘tourism’ and instead uses 
‘cross border reproductive care’, adopting the terminology used by Royal Australian and 
New Zealand College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RANZCOG) (2016). CBRC has 
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been an influential concept and the accepted term within the clinical literature, although care 
may be lacking in instances of transnational reproduction.  
     The numbers of Australians travelling for CBRC is unknown. The most recent inquiry into 
ART in the Australian state of Victoria stated that ‘…a large, but unquantified, number travel 
overseas for ART’ (Gorton 2019). The existing policy framework in Australia therefore fails 
to prevent and reduce reproductive travel. Theoretically, a strong regulatory approach has a 
general deterrent effect on the behaviour of would-be violators (Ross 1982; 1992). The 
prevalence of travel for CBRC suggests that dilemmas and risks associated with travel are not 
removed by strict legislation but are instead relocated. In Australia, three jurisdictions (New 
South Wales, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory) have criminal penalties 
attached to cross border travel, while most jurisdictions prohibit commercial surrogacy. 
However, the existence of these penalties did not prevent our interviewees from illegally 
crossing borders. Travel for CBRC is likely to continue, as when patients know they can go 
elsewhere, they are less likely to protest against overly strict legislation, and legislators who 
find certain procedures objectionable may be more likely to enact or maintain overly 
restrictive regulations (Storrow 2010). Thus, when theorizing the ethics of reproductive 
technologies and the contradictions between state policies and individual desires, one must 
take care not to equate lack of regulation with more freedom and choice, and regulation with 
constraint.  
 
1.2 The Medicalisation of Infertility  
 
The global industry of assisted reproduction is predicated upon the classification of infertility 
as a disease of the reproductive system and its treatment through in vitro fertilisation (IVF). 
However, infertility was not always a disease; prior to the late 1970s, it was generally seen as 
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a social condition (Conrad et al. 2010), and society generally accepted it as natural but 
disappointing to be childless. Following the birth of Louise Brown, the first child born 
through IVF, in 1978, the medical fraternity began to identify infertility as a medical 
condition. The Australian state of Victoria became the first jurisdiction in the world to enact 
legislation regulating ART, with the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984 coming into 
effect in 1988 (Law Reform Committee 2012: xix). This legislation marked the beginning in 
Australia of legal protection of the infertile as a category of patient, and regulation of fertility 
clinicians.  
     This process, whereby a social issue becomes a medical condition, is described by medical 
sociologists as medicalisation. Conrad defines this as where ‘nonmedical problems become 
defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illness or disorders’ (Conrad 
1992). Infertility is now defined by the World Health Organisation as ‘the failure to achieve a 
clinical pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse’ (World 
Health Organization n.d.; see also Montgomery 2016), and is common issue, with a global 
prevalence of approximately 9 per cent (Leyser-Whalen et al. 2018: 446).2 For these infertile 
individuals, it is ‘now expected that infertility is something to be overcome’ (Bell 2010: 634), 
with technology offered as a solution (Sandelowski 1991). As Franklin observes, technology 
‘…is positioned as a helpmate to nature: it allow[s] fertilisation to occur’ (Franklin 1975: 
175), such that other options for family creation – adoption, fostering and childlessness –  are 
seen as second best and even characterised as an admission of failure (Donhcin 2011).  
     The reasons as to why individual patients cross borders, often illegally, for reproductive 
care are described as ‘push pull’ factors (Jackson et al. 2017). For example, in Cheryl’s case 
there is the ‘push’ factor of the absence of care in Australia, and the ‘pull’ factor of 
                                              
2 51.8 per cent of women aged 25–45 report infertility at some point in their lives and fewer than 50 percent of 
infertile women receive medical treatment (Greil et al. 2011). 
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commercial surrogacy being available in India. Cheryl was able to circumvent the conditions 
of Australia by choosing a surrogate mother in India, where her and her husband had cheaper 
services and sole parental rights. However, as standards of labour are higher in Australia, the 
Indian surrogate is  subject to practices that would not have been tolerated had she been an 
Australian citizen.   
      The economic power imbalance between the traveller and the third parties who assist 
them to create a family, such as a surrogate or a gamete donor, creates an assumption that 
reproductive travellers act from a position of power. Citizens of a nation state are thus 
transformed into stateless global consumers, able to buy their way out of inconvenient or 
onerous domestic policies including restrictive regulations, expensive treatment and long 
waiting lists. Reproductive travel is emphasised as a personal choice, made because of 
opportunities offered in destination countries such as donor anonymity, level of service, or 
access to services not available in the home jurisdiction like commercial surrogacy or sex 
selection.  
 
1.3 The Study: sociological bioethics  
 
This paper draws upon a larger empirical study of the lived experiences of Australians who 
travel to undertake CBRC. The study has a patient centred approach which is informed by 
social scientific studies rather than being clinically oriented (Greil et al. 2010). The focus was 
Australians who cross borders, nationally or internationally, and legally or illegally. A total of 
93 interviews were conducted. Of these, 37 interviews were with people who had travelled 
overseas, to countries including India, Thailand, Nepal, Mexico, Spain, South Africa, Greece, 
Canada and the USA; ten interviewees travelled to more than one country. A further 19 had 
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crossed borders within Australia to access services. This paper focuses upon these 56 
interviewees. 
     A conventional content analysis was used to analyse the collected data. All interviews 
were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interviews were entered, without identification, 
into NVIVO software to enable thematic coding and analysis. Pseudonyms are used in this 
paper. All three investigators contributed to coding themes and held multiple meetings to 
discuss and cross-check coding to ensure consistency of approach.  
     This paper uses a deductive thematic analysis (Bartholomaeus and Riggs 2018) to focus 
upon the issue of autonomy with respect to those 56 interviewees who engaged in cross-
border travel. The analysis is based upon the shared identities of the traveller as patient, 
consumer and traveller. Only a small number of interviewees – around 10 – knew they were 
medically unable to have children before embarking on treatment. These 10 individuals are a 
combination of socially infertile, for example being gay, or medically infertile, for example 
not having a uterus. As socially infertile individuals across most Australian jurisdictions are 
able to access ARTs (Bell 2010), all interviewees share the attributes of patient (even if they 
themselves are not treated), consumer and traveller.   
     Like Paton (2018), I believe that bioethical inquiry can be ‘done’ under the auspices of 
sociology. As such, this paper uses the in-depth interviews with both men and women from 
this cohort to explore autonomy, and takes a socio-legal approach to advance empirical 
bioethics. It is also part of a growing body of empirical work contributing to bioethical 
inquiry (Wangmo and Provoost 2017). In facilitating the production of personal knowledge 
and applying it to the structures within which the choice to travel for CBRC is made, I 
explore the limits and the operation of autonomous choice making in cross-border 
reproductive care. This is a bottom-up approach, as arguably an understanding of the 
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application of the ethical principle of autonomy emerges only from the lived experience of 
individuals.  
 
1.4 Autonomy and reproductive autonomy: a brief overview  
 
The preservation and promotion of autonomy, which in general terms allows individuals to 
direct the course of their own life, is a key concern in the provision of individualized, patient-
centered, ethical health care. In the language of Milligan and Jones, in health care autonomy 
is the ‘principal principle’ (Milligan and Jones 2017). In Australia, respect for autonomy by 
health professionals is a key principle of the common law where courts have had to consider 
the implications of reproductive autonomy in cases concerning surrogacy agreements (Re 
Evelyn 1998), and the use of a male partner’s stored semen after his death (Creswell v 
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland 2018). It is also a key concept in biomedical 
ethics, and underpins the National Health and Medical Research Council’s ‘Ethical guidelines 
on the use of assisted reproductive technology in clinical practice and research (ART 
guidelines)’ governing the delivery of fertility services.3  
     However, while the term autonomy is the principle principal in health care. it is not easy 
to define (see e.g. Sandel 1982; Sherwin 1998: 19; Schneider 1998). In bioethics literature 
there is ‘no theory of autonomy that spells out its nature, its moral implications, its limits...’ 
(Beauchamp 2004: 214). As Dworkin explains, we have ‘one concept and many conceptions 
of autonomy...’ (Dworkin 1988: 9), with the term being used in: 
... an exceedingly broad fashion. It is sometimes used as an equivalent of 
liberty (positive or negative in Berlin’s terminology), sometimes as 
                                              
3 While less relevant for Australia’s domestic legal system support for reproductive autonomy is found in 
international instruments (such as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the International Conference on Population and 
Development, and the European Convention on Human Rights).  
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equivalent to self-rule or sovereignty, sometimes as identical with freedom 
of the will. It is equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, 
responsibility and self-knowledge. It is identified with qualities of self assertion, 
with critical reflection, with freedom from obligation, with absence 
of external causation, with knowledge of one’s own interests.... It is related 
to actions, to beliefs, to reasons for acting, to rules, to the will of other 
persons, to thoughts and to principles. About the only features held constant 
from one author to another are that autonomy is a characteristic of persons 
and that it is a desirable quality to have. (Dworkin 1988: 9) 
Dworkin’s framing of autonomy as a desirable quality originates in the work of Immanuel 
Kant, who argued that respect for autonomy flows from ‘the recognition that all persons have 
unconditional worth and the capacity to determine their own moral destiny’ (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2001). Kant’s framework is one where autonomy is focused upon individual 
choice, allowing the individual to navigate their lives with the freedom to do what they wish.  
     This traditional understanding of autonomy is applied in bioethics. Beauchamp and 
Childress (2009), who developed the principles of justice, non-maleficence and beneficence 
in bioethics, define personal autonomy in a Kantian way: ‘self rule that is free from both 
controlling influence by others and from limitations, such as inadequate understanding, that is 
present in meaningful choice’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 57-112). However, 
Beauchamp and Childress also recognise that internal and external forces impact autonomy. 
In recognising limitations on autonomy, Beauchamp and Childress depart from Kantian 
constructions of autonomy and adopt the John Mills’ understanding of state limitations on 
personal liberty (Mill 1909). These limits restrict the two essential conditions for autonomy, 
liberty and agency (Beauchamp and Childress 2001: 57-112).  
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      This paper begins from Beauchamp and Childress’ acceptance of limits upon autonomy. 
It uses this concept to explore the forces which curtail reproductive autonomy. Reproductive 
autonomy is simultaneously a ‘negative’ freedom, such as with legal abortion where third 
parties are stopped from restricting individual reproductive choices, as well as a ‘positive’ 
freedom that requires facilitation of reproductive liberty (Robertson 1994). Yet neither form 
fully explains the application of autonomy to CBRC. For example, in the case of Cheryl, who 
decided to use a surrogate in India, a choice was made to pursue surrogacy. However, this 
decision also involved a choice to use another person’s body. This raises complex questions 
such as: is it ever an exercise of autonomy to use another’s body for a medical procedure for 
reproduction?  How is it a personal right to procreate when someone else must be employed 
to do so? Is that autonomous? On the other hand, CBRC for both Cheryl and the third parties 
who assist her in reproduction may equally create opportunity for genuine autonomy.  
     This contradiction in reproductive autonomy has long been flagged by feminist scholars, 
who are unable to agree on which scenario is correct. Access to reproductive technology is 
not characterised as a feminist issue of reproductive freedom, nor is there a unified feminist 
response. This is despite that fact that while reproductive autonomy is important to both men 
and women, it is particularly significant for women, with respect to intrusiveness of 
treatment, because childbearing takes place in women’s bodies, and reproduction has many 
consequences for women’s lives (Purdy 2006). The absence of a unified feminist response 
arises in part due to an inability to agree as to how autonomous women’s choice making 
really is. Firestone, for example, envisioned that reproductive technologies could be used as a 
tool to liberate women from the birth process and the corollary responsibility of childrearing 
(Firestone 1970), whereas at the other end of the spectrum, Corea (1985) equated 
reproductive technology with high-tech prostitution and the degradation of women. 
Additionally, aspects of reproductive travel have been decried for their ethical implications 
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which brush against autonomy. For example, travel by the wealthy exploits the poor, with 
such exploitation undermining the laws and policies (and thus sovereignty) of nation-states, 
and reinforcing existing global inequalities (Waldby and Cooper 2008).  
 
1.5 Brief review of literature  
 
The ethics of CBRC is well traversed (Pennings et al. 2008). According to Couture et al., 
CBRC has generated an important ethical literature mostly addressing four families of issues: 
(1) ethico-legal, (2) medical ethics, (3) feminist ethics, and (4) cellular ethics. Despite this, 
they note that in 2019 ‘the conclusions are still based on scarce evidence even considering the 
global scale of CBRC. Empirical ethics appears as a way to foster this ethical reflection on 
CBRC while attuning it with the experiences of its main actors’ (Couture et al. 2019: 41). 
This echoes the call made by Inhorn and Patrizio (2012) for what they said is a ‘most urgent 
need...for more empirical research, both quantitative and qualitative in nature’ (Inhorn and 
Patrizio 2012). There is also a scarcity of evidence in Australia. The empirical research that 
has been undertaken as to travel for CBRC is focused upon the third party who assists in 
reproduction, such as the egg donor or surrogate (Whittaker and Speier 2010: 364; Waldby 
2019), or on issues such as donor choice. The autonomy of the traveller is generally assumed 
rather than explored. 
     Importantly, this paper is a bioethical inquiry which engages with scholarship on the 
ethics of ART more broadly. It suggests that the autonomy of travellers for CBRC is 
restricted and contradictory but does not advocate a ‘right’ to medical travel or a ‘right’ to 
procreate, nor is it an attack on autonomy (Foster 2009; Fox and Swazey 2008; McLean 
2010). In keeping with the interdisciplinary nature of bioethical inquiry, it draws upon 
medical sociologists, anthropologists, and the relational understandings of feminist legal 
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scholars (Farrell et al. 2017; Morgan 1998), to assess the adequacy of the liberal notion of 
autonomy. It argues that autonomy does not work where the medicalisation of infertility 
masks the role of technology and science, undermining understandings of the context within 
which choices are made. This argument builds upon Meyers’ (1989) understanding that 
autonomy involves skills matched to the external environment within one must make choices. 
This restriction is apparent across all three categories of patient, consumer, and traveller for 
CBRC. Further, the interviews evidence marginalisation of infertile individuals, and show 
that the decisions they make are based upon a lack of self-worth and an over emphasis on 
belief in the miracle of the technologies provided by the medical profession. Reduced self-
trust further impacts one’s ability to act autonomously. In this way, the interviewees 
internalise society’s attitudes and doubt their own ability to make good decisions (Mackenzie 
and Stoljar 2000: 263).  
 
2 The Patient, the Consumer and the Traveller: the limits of autonomy  
The bioethical principle of autonomy is consistently used to frame travel for CBRC. For 
example, the Australian medical profession supports the autonomy of individuals who travel 
for CBRC stating that ‘…all parties must be provided with appropriate information and 
counselling to make an informed decision whether to proceed to CBRC’ (Royal Australian 
and New Zealand College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 2016). This section probes the 
application of autonomy to travellers for CBRC across their identities as patients, consumers 
and travellers. Using the interviews, it establishes that the treatment process, from the 
perspective of users, is confusing, complex, expensive and harmful. This compromises their 
ability to make autonomous decisions. 
 




In Australian health law, consent is the process through which autonomy is realised. The 
provision of consent is not just based upon a legal or moral right to make decisions for 
oneself, but is also an ethical obligation for doctors to treat patients with trust and dignity.  
Patients should trust that the health care professional will act honestly and for the well-being 
of the patient, and that the patient’s wishes will be respected and supported. Patient faith in 
the medical profession is a pillar of the Australian medical system. As the Medical Board of 
Australia states, ‘trust in the relationship between doctors and patients is a cornerstone of 
good medical practice’ (Medical Board of Australia 2018). The Australian Code of Conduct 
for Doctors similarly observes that ‘patients trust their doctors because they believe that, in 
addition to being competent, their doctor will not take advantage of them and will display 
qualities such as integrity, truthfulness, dependability and compassion’ (Australian Medical 
Council 2009). Organisational factors have been recognised as important in maintaining 
patient faith: personnel styles, availability and respect afforded by both administrative and 
clinical staff, reasonable waiting times, and attention to personal comfort (Dorr Goold and 
Lipkin 1994). 
 
2.1.1 Loss of faith: organisational factors  
Women in our study who had undergone IVF treatment expressed a loss of faith in the 
medical profession across all organisational factors. Sometimes this loss was attributed to a 
difference of opinion between the patient and doctor, as Cybil explained: ‘[the doctor] just 
refused to entertain any difference. I had to leave him. I was like I can’t have you as my 
ob/gyn if you can’t even accept this, sorry, bye’. Other times it was the absence of a valued 
personal characteristic, as articulated by Maria: ‘Australia, it wasn’t what I expected.  I 
expected people to be much more helpful. First of all, just the clinics to have more 
compassion and be more compassionate towards people in my situation.’ Still, for others it 
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was an absence of information, the essence of consent, as Olivia said: ‘I was given very little 
information about whether my eggs would be viable and everyone was just encouraging me 
to do more cycles of IVF.’  
     For others it was frustration with the administration of the process. For example, in 
reference to a meeting of the Western Australian ethics committee to approve their 
application to undertake IVF, a husband and wife noted: 
 [I]t had actually got delayed a month because it was Christmas [they had decided 
not to meet]...it’s awful feeling powerless in that position, where you really want 
something but when you’re reliant on other people who, to me, just weren’t 
professional, and weren’t good at what they were doing. But then you had to put 
your trust in these people to have a child.  
     The above comments, ranging from the poor personal and professional care, to an absence 
of trust, typify the responses of interviewees. A relationship with doctors based upon trust 
and dignity was not evident amongst the interviewees, undermining the legal and medical 
framing of consent.   
 
2.1.2 Loss of faith: recurring harm and pain 
It just changes you and it changes you as a person.  Like each cycle and each 
transfer you have, you lose a piece of yourself.  Like it's like a little spark of you 
dies each time and you never get it back.  Like it's just - you just wonder if you're 
ever going the happiness and your bubbliness and your outgoingness again, 
because it does - it just kills a piece of you every time you do it. (Rosalind) 
     Rosalind’s observation, that IVF ‘kills a piece of you’, captures how infertility treatment 
exposes individuals to recurring harm and pain. Over the entire cohort of interviewees, every 
female interviewee who underwent IVF experienced a range of adverse events, such as 
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multiple IVF attempts, recurrent miscarriages, financial costs of up to AU$250,000, partner 
loss, and issues of self-esteem and worthlessness.  
     For all interviewees, fertility care was most often characterised as anything but care, and 
was instead experienced as a cascading ride of unsuccessful treatment. Once diagnosed as 
infertile, interviewees began with one treatment and ended up in a vastly different place. As 
May put it:  
We’ve gone from hoping we could do it ourselves, to needing an egg donor, to 
needing a sperm donor, to using overseas eggs, to being fortunate enough to have 
access to some donor embryos, to possibly considering a surrogate, to considering 
a surrogate overseas. 
     May’s statement traverses the entirety of ART treatments and surrogacy, revealing the 
extraordinary and unforeseen pathways that medicalised treatment can lead to. May’s 
experience illustrates how her original consent to treatment set her down unexpected paths, 
with a consequent unwillingness or inability to stop treatment. Far from autonomy operating 
as a principle of protection in her treatment, the diagnosis of infertility led to an ongoing and 
uncertain treatment regime. 
     Ultimately, some interviewees ceased treatment due to receiving a diagnosis of 
‘unexplained fertility’, or because they had become too old for treatment. As Rina, a 
heterosexual woman who was an intending parent through a surrogate, explains: 
[T]he last three and a half years we’ve been going through IVF. So we had about 
14 cycles with seven transfers…in August last year we were told we would need 
to look at a different pathway to try to have a baby. It took me probably six 
months to get my head around that and accept that was going to happen.  
     In reference to being told to look ‘for a different pathway’ by a doctor, Rina noted, ‘that 
was probably the best thing that we’ve ever had happen in this journey is someone being 
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really honest with us.’ The inference here is that honesty from the medical profession, and a 
choice of alternate treatment options, had not been offered to Rina before that moment. Rina 
is dependent on doctors to tell her when to stop hoping. Yet health professionals may have 
little motivation to advise her to do so, especially for a private market-based ailment like 
infertility (Sandelowski 1991; Conrad and Leiter 2004). This will be discussed further in 
part 3.  
     The experience of not knowing when to stop treatment, and not being advised of 
alternative treatment pathways, was shared across interviewees. As Monique observes: 
[M]y husband, Alex, and I did 10 years of IVF - maybe nine years - with lots of 
transfers. So I think almost up to about 30 transfers. They weren't all stimulated 
cycles, and they said in the end, they said well you have lots of embryos, you're 
probably all right in that sense. Maybe you need to think about other options, so 
we decided we'll give surrogacy a go. So that worked first go.  
     Monique’s experience typifies how the medical profession encouraged interviewees to 
keep using technology as a cure for their infertility. This is the case even following repeated 
failure. As Shirley explains: 
The doctors couldn’t identify any problem, couldn’t work out why these 13 
rounds of IVF that we did weren’t working…We went to several different doctors 
in Sydney. We went to a doctor in Melbourne who has an interesting practice. I 
moved down to Melbourne for a month to do that. Nothing worked and the 
doctors kept saying, “just keep going, there is nothing wrong with you, just keep 
going it will work”.  
     As a patient the doctors could find nothing wrong with Shirley. The treatment is not 
working yet she is encouraged to keep going. Technology is meant to help Shirley, yet it does 
the opposite. It does not help her through 13 rounds of IVF and yet her relationship to the 
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treatment made it impossible to stop using it. As Franklin (2013) has observed, the existence 
of the technology makes it harder for individuals to reproduce without it. Shirley had to keep 
going until all avenues were exhausted. Ultimately Shirley went to India, used the couple’s 
own embryos, and found success ‘first time round’. 
     Shirley’s experience highlights how the medicalisation of infertility acts to firstly, create 
the problem of infertility and secondly, hold out the promise for a medical cure for it. As 
Sandelowski (1991) argues, technology can be a boon and a burden for infertile couples as 
while the possibilities of a ‘cure’ have increased, so have the risks. One of those risks is that 
‘technology may reinforce suffering’, as there is an increase in uncertainty because decisions 
around ending or changing the treatment cannot be made. The infertile individual is placed 
upon a trajectory of treatment through medical technology which begins with IVF and, as a 
successful live birth fails to materialise, will result in a plethora of tests and multiple 
treatments. These treatments can be difficult and painful. As Shirley, states she:  
went to a reproductive immunologist specialist here and took lots of drugs that 
were – you have to go into hospital overnight and have intravenous drips where 
they drip medicine into you which calms down your immune system. It’s the 
same medicine they give transplant patients to help their body accept a new 
organ.  
     Shirley’s inability to remove herself from medical treatment earlier than she did was due 
to a perceived absence of alternative options. Thus while technology seemingly created 
choices for her, it also reduced her ability to see alternative pathways. 
 
2.1.3 Experience of patients versus non-patients 
Inherent contradictions in the principle of autonomy as it applies to travellers for CBRC is 
clear when the experience of the ‘patients’ and ‘non-patients’ are juxtaposed. The non-
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patients are individuals excluded from medical treatment because they are socially infertile, 
for example gay men, or they are individuals who always knew they were medically infertile, 
for example women who have no uterus. These individuals are termed ‘non-patients’ as they 
are largely invisible to treatment providers given the irrelevancy of infertile medical services 
for them.  
     Our study shows that family creation was faster and easier for the cohort of non-patients 
than for patients undergoing IVF treatment. For example, for Tom, a gay man who undertook 
international surrogacy, the time between signing the contract to the birth of a child was ten 
and a half months. Similarly, for Harry and his partner, the process took 12 months, including 
the period prior to actually signing with agent and research time. Both partners engaged a 
surrogate using the same egg donor, and their twins were born on the same day. The process 
was also fast for Beth, a heterosexual woman who said: ‘I knew that if I did want to have a 
child, surrogacy would be an option because I had eggs…so we were really lucky.’  
 
The non-patient interviewees evidence less physical, emotional and financial harm as a result 
of total exclusion from medical treatment. This is not to infer that non-patients found the 
process to be simple, nor that they did not face difficulty in travel for CRBC. Rather a 
comparative approach reveals that on balance being marginalised from medical treatment 
results in less harm than those patients who were treated.  Here the apparent contradiction 
arises that the principle of autonomy, designed to protect patients, results in increased harm 
for infertile individuals. This point is deserving of more research.   
 
2.1.4 The mismatch between medicine and the infertile individual   
While medicine constructs infertility as a medical condition, all of the interviewees framed 
their experiences as non-medical, with no interviewee referring to themselves as having a 
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disease. Indeed, not one interviewee used the label of ‘infertility’ or ‘infertile’ to describe 
their experience. This finding – that infertile individuals reject the medical framing of their 
state as a disease – is in keeping with international research (see Leyser-Whalen et al. 2018).   
     Techniques used by interviewees to avoid references to infertility include factual 
references to an inability to have a child. For example, Penelope explained her miscarriages 
by saying: ‘We've certainly never made it to the 12-week mark. I think maybe once we made 
it to 10 weeks’. Penelope thus measures her pregnancies in weeks, rather than describing 
herself as infertile. Another interviewee, Beth, likened her ability to reproduce to a 
lawnmower. Beth is a heterosexual woman who had been diagnosed with cancer, but 
eventually became pregnant with twins. She observed that, ‘[d]ue to the cancer treatment, my 
ovaries weren’t working very well, bit like a rusty old lawnmower that works sometimes and 
then wouldn’t’. Beth’s description reveals an important asymmetry between the medico-legal 
regulation framework and the application of it to the infertile individual. While the 
professions place importance on defining infertility, Beth rejects that and describes her 
ovaries as something that ‘works sometimes’. In this way, Beth takes control of her identity 
as an exercise of autonomy, but not as a medical patient. The relevance of the medicalisation 
of her condition is removed. Other interviewees explicitly denied the relevance of medicine, 
such as Derrick, a gay man, who, when referring to his social infertility, explained: ‘I didn’t 
seek out any medical information because it wasn’t relevant I think to my situation’.  
     The refusal of interviewees to use the medical diagnosis of infertility confirms the gap 
between a medicalised construct of identity and personal control over one’s own identity. The 
label of infertility was only used by interviewees a handful of times, and only when repeating 
the ascription of characteristics or associated symptoms given to it as a disease by the 
medical profession, or reiterating a diagnosis given by practitioners. The interviewees’ 
experiences capture a one-way transmission of information from the profession, which is 
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more characteristic of a paternalistic style of medicine. For example, Abbie explained that 
‘we had sort of unexplained infertility, but you know, when they don't really know and you've 
got a fairly low egg count and egg quality’. Ethan, a member of a couple, noted sarcastically 
that ‘it got called unexplained infertility, which is always helpful’. Ethan’s sarcasm both 
reinforces the unwanted imposition of the term by the medical profession, and reflects his 
scepticism about the label’s meaning when the ‘disease’ cannot be explained or cured. The 
only other usage of the term was either associated with characteristics of the disease – ‘With 
infertility you can get used to all the different stages of grief’.  
     Medicalisation of infertility results in importing medical understandings into the 
appropriateness of desire for, use of, and restrictions to treatment (see Smart 2002: 110-113), 
a process which feminist scholars have long identified as having a negative impact upon 
women’s bodies (Rich 1977; Rowland 1987). Greil et al. (1988) found that gender plays a 
crucial role in how men and women experience infertility, with women feeling that their 
inability to have children is stigmatizing and spoils their identities as women. Similarly, for 
the women in our cohort, the label of infertility had more of a negative impact. Some 
interviewees highlighted their distress at being identified in terms of their fertility, where the 
category ultimately became their primary identity. Paige stated: 
I got married, knowing that was great practice for becoming a mum and then 15 
years later we finally gave up and divorced because of the stress and strain of it 
all - of total unexplained infertility. There is everything - every test has always 
come back as perfect. It was just year after year after year of frustration and new 
additional tests. Then I started travelling outside of the country to figure out who 
I was.  
     Paige views her infertility as preventing her from becoming a mother, and forcing 
her to rethink her self-identity. The impossibility of using medical technology to cure 
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her infertility framed her individual identity and choice-making in her decision to create 
a family. The use of medical technology is instrumental in Paige’s narrative, as it is in 
almost all of the experiences of our interviewees.   
 
2.2 The Consumer 
2.2.1 Technology and cost 
Franklin (2013) observes that it has become ‘normal’ to choose technology as the cure for 
infertility. The infertility industry caters for this demand. The medicalisation of infertility is 
based on a private medicalised market, which results in a for‐profit, business structure of 
healthcare provision. This marketplace is funded by government subsidies and by users. Since 
the early 1990s, a co-payment system under Medicare has publicly subsidised treatment, but 
there are routinely large gaps between fees set by the clinic and subsidy payments (Chambers 
et al. 2013). Women from more affluent backgrounds use more ART treatment than poorer 
women, reflecting both a greater ability to pay for treatment and a greater need for ART 
treatment, as indicated by the Western trend to later childbearing (Chambers et al. 2013).  
     Across our interviewees, the expense of treatment was high. When asked to estimate cost, 
typical comments were that ‘the money was extreme’ (Jane), ‘the costs are very high’ (Zara), 
or, as one interviewee described, ‘during the time that we did IVF, the cost doubled. It just 
went up - every six months, there'd be a letter saying, costs have gone up. They would go up 
by, I don't know, $500-$800 each time’. Estimates of up to AU$100,000 for domestic altruistic 
surrogacy, and up to AU$250,000 for surrogacy in the United States were not unusual. As 
Carys, an intending parent for surrogacy, observed, she:  
…did 10 IVF cycles. So roughly at about $5000 each after Medicare - so what is 
that - like roughly about $50,000 in transfers. We did six transfers at about $5000 
a pop. So there's $30,000. So we're at $80,000 just fertility treatments.  
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     Another interviewee, Lauren, says:  
Yeah, so, the lawyers both together have been $3000. The counselling I'd say all up has 
probably been about $1500…, let's say $3000 in travel. So what's that eight, nine, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, $15,500. Which is pretty cheap [so far].  
     One married interviewee, when asked about the pros and cons of the pathway that she and 
her husband had taken, responded: 
I don't know if there's any pros. I felt like - I feel like - this is my personal opinion 
and the IVF doctor in America agrees with me - I don't think Australian IVF 
doctors are very honest. I mean probably some of them are but I think it gets to a 
certain point where their honesty needs to come into it - some people are just not 
going to produce a child and I don't think that they do that in Australia. They just 
don't tell you that. They just keep saying it's a numbers game. I got told that so 
many times - it's a numbers game, it's a numbers game. When you walk out of the 
parking lot and you're on transfer number 20 and there's three Bentleys parked in 
the carpark, you start to think mm, is it a numbers game or am I just lining your 
wallet. I don't know.  
     Australia is not alone with these critical and cynical observations as to cost and commerce. 
In Spain and Israel the impact of private commercial interest on regulations is resulting in 
excessive practices such as the repeat of ineffective cycles and the push of sometimes 
unnecessary treatment add-ons (Alon et al. 2019).  
     Alongside the large amounts of money paid, there was a recurrent theme about who was 
receiving the payments, as the marketplace extends well beyond the medical profession. One 
of the interviewees, Lachlan, described the different professionals paid in relation to the 
birth of his son, Alastair:  
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So including IVF treatment it was about $80,000 that we spent out of our own 
pocket with Alastair. That went to either the medical profession or the legal 
profession. It's quite clear that there's no sympathy involved, they've got quite - 
every piece of the puzzle has got an extravagant fee, even for the ethics panel 
there was a fee. You think what is - it just seems - I can only - it just seemed to be 
different economy in terms of pricing as well. You have no option there, you're 
limited in terms of the number of providers in the case. So you're sort of well, 
okay, I need to bear that cost. 
     Lachlan’s comments concerning the lack of options and choice squarely raises the issue of 
autonomy and gaps in protection offered by fertility industry practice regulation for patients.4 
Lachlan’s description paints a picture of a monopoly of few providers and little choice, with 
an inference that any option to stop is not viable. Instead of stopping, many interviewees 
consider themselves to be ‘lucky’ to be able to afford the services offered:  
We're just lucky that we can afford to do what we do. There are a lot of people 
out there who can't, and they would have given up on their dreams of being 
parents. We’re just - like if we didn't have our business, there's no way we could 
afford to keep doing IVF. We've already spent 80,000 dollars.  
     And noted that they would spend what they had to, whatever that may be: 
The short answer is I think it cost too much. The long answer is what are you 
prepared to pay for a child? What is a child worth? Who should get the money? 
Are we paying the right people? (Cybil)  
     Being ‘lucky’ to pay large amounts to access ART treatments reveals how patients in the 
commercial infertility industry are uncomfortable bedfellows. The hope of the consumer that 
                                              
4 This can be seen across medical law; see, for example, the use of the Bolam test for negligence (Brazier and 
Miola 2000).  
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medical treatment will ‘work’ pushes the individual in directions that are masked as rational 
free will and choice under the guise of medical autonomy. The result for many interviewees 
is exorbitant charges and little choice of providers and assistance. 
     Consumers also face a confusing marketplace in terms of choice of clinic and services, 
with the marketplace itself subject to unscrupulous behavior. In the United States, the fertility 
industry is described as the ‘Wild West’ (Paul 2004; Spar 2011), with fertility practitioners 
being referred to as ‘cowboys’ (Knoepfler 2016). The perception of a fertility industry that 
‘peddles false hope’ (Kidspot 2016), and centres its own profits before patient care, is not 
restricted to the US. Recent crackdowns have been announced in the UK due to allegations 
that some clinics exploit low-income women to egg share (Bentley et al. 2017). In Australia, 
Virtus Health controversially5 announced a “High Performer Share Incentive Scheme”, 
offering large cash to doctors who deliver more than 400 cycles per annum over a 3-year 
period (Virtus Health 2018). Virtus later stated that the bonus would have ‘no influence at all 
on clinic practice’ (Virtus Health 2017). Recently, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission forced several major IVF clinics to change claims published on their websites 
about IVF success rates following an investigation into potentially false or misleading 
representations.  
 
2.2.2 Believing in miracles: The absence of free will and choice and the industry  
Recent research confirms that, while patients have become more ‘consumerist in their 
approach’ (Hall et al. 2001; Lupton et al. 1991; Zadoroznyj 2001), they also believe in 
treatment by doctors and medical science. Reproductive medicine thus acts to create certainty 
where there is ambiguity. Gerritt’s (2014) ethnographic study of patient centred fertility care 
in a Dutch clinic confirms a loss of rational decision making in ART patients. Gerritt’s study 
                                              
5 One journalist calling it “terrifying” (Price 2017).  
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found that, while patient centred care seems to give more power over decision making to 
patients, at the same time, because the interpersonal focus in patient centred care builds an 
intimacy between patients and clinic staff, it also means patients become more dependent on 
doctors and take a less active role in decision making, diminishing patient agency.  
     This loss of free will in decision making is also apparent amongst our cohort: 
But there's also that little bit of you that says, you're not a worthwhile person 
unless you have kids…Intellectually I don't believe in it, but emotionally it has 
been present all my life. (Millie)  
 
I had this drive to basically keep going because if you’re going to try long enough 
you are going to get there. (Helen) 
     As Shelby, who travelled to South Africa for egg donation, states:  
…when I look at the entire IVF process I think I blindly followed my doctor’s 
advice for the first six cycles…I just had faith it was going to work…I didn’t 
really understand just how tenuous it all is and the fact that it’s not the golden 
ticket. 
     Shelby’s comments indicate a sense of unquestioning trust in medicine, science and 
technology. The notion that IVF is the ‘golden ticket’ is a common misconception amongst 
our interviewees, confirming a shared belief that science is the winning cure for infertility. By 
prioritising the potential offered by technology as a cure, our interviewees defer to, privilege 
and support the expertise of medicine.  
     In this context, autonomy is impacted by the conflation of research and treatment, where 
technological advancement is success in and of itself. For example, Virtus has recently been 
engaging software companies to develop their ‘IVY’ artificial intelligence program which is 
being used to select the ‘best’ embryo for transfer, that is, embryos which are more likely to 
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result in a heartbeat (LaFrenz 2018; see also Australian Business Register n.d.). Scientific 
research like this is used to reinforce the certainty of IVF. It may also be used to treat non-
infertile patients for problems that are not related to infertility, where IVF is undertaken as an 
elective procedure for the purposes of genetic diagnosis, or where egg freezing is used by 
those who anticipate a future diagnosis of infertility (Salleh 2018). The miracle of having a 
child is slowly transformed by the misleading creation of scientific certainty, when no such 
certainty exists. 
 
2.3 The Traveller 
 
International studies establish that patients have difficulty putting a stop to treatment (Greil et 
al. 2010), as there is a persistent belief that a miracle will occur. The decision to travel across 
borders, often illegally, becomes a logical extension of fertility treatment, where many of our 
interviewees go further and further down a path in hope of success and form intimate 
relationships with specific clinics, agents (Millbank 2018), and physicians in the other 
jurisdiction.6 Travel, as an extension of unsuccessful fertility treatment, becomes the only 
rational choice, with the alternative to travel being acceptance of childlessness.  
 
2.3.1 Desperation, risk and fear 
The decision to travel is made against a backdrop of a pervasive industry, a dominating 
narrative of technology as cure, an air of finality, and a sense of desperation, risk and fear. 
Assessment of risk is itself medicalised, as it is made by comparing clinical standards, 
removing natural conception as a point of comparison (Sandelowski 1991: 41), and instead 
                                              
6 This is supported by research findings that fertility patients highly value interpersonal relationships with 
doctors, and individualised care, especially given the emotional nature of fertility treatment (see Dancet et al. 
2011; Malin et al. 2001; van Empel et al. 2011)  
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employing a ‘least worst’ approach. For example, Tasha identified risk as follows:  
You're putting your trust in donors that are overseas and they're not being 
regulated by your own government so you're not sure if everything is done above 
board. That's why I chose America, because I thought it would be less likely for 
there to be a lot of dodgy things going on.  
     Tasha’s decision making is made within an external context that is disempowering. She is 
not choosing America for what it offers her, but rather because it is likely to be ‘less dodgy’. 
She therefore acknowledges personal and economic risk. This desperation and knowledge of 
risk is similarly described by Derrick, a gay man travelling for surrogacy, who explained that 
‘[y]ou're handing over thousands or tens of thousands of dollars to some random stranger in a 
foreign country and, you know, it would be nice to know that the whole thing isn't a Nigerian 
scam’. The loss of control and willingness to pursue a family, at great risk, is palpable. 
 
2.3.2 A double voiced discourse of autonomy 
As Tasha and Derrick’s comments reveal, fertility travellers base their accountability 
relationships with clinics on subjective trust, rather than on objective compliance with 
specific standards of performance.7 For most interviewees, the decision to travel across 
borders was a last resort, and a difficult option to take. For many interviewees, when help 
was withdrawn by the domestic regulatory framework, the cross-border clinic filled the 
vacuum of care, often becoming the sole point of reference for the health and well-being of 
the cross-border reproductive traveller. As Rosalind, who underwent egg donation in Greece 
with her husband, observed, ‘We obviously put all our trust and all our faith into the doctor’. 
Travellers lose autonomy as the clinic becomes the facilitator, the connection between the 
                                              
7 Unlike, for example, the fair trade movement (see Davenport and Low 2013: 89). 
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traveller and third parties (Krolokke 2017: 62), the point of trust, and the provider of its own 
accountability. 
     However, while travellers lose control, they are also keenly aware of the impact they have 
on the vulnerable third parties who assist them to create a family. Tom, who travelled to India 
for surrogacy, said of paying the surrogate: ‘I wanted to hand over the final payment. Just to 
ensure there was nothing fishy going on’. Shirley, who similarly travelled to India, said: 
‘You’re told lots of things about the surrogate which you just believe’, following which she 
laughed, indicating she did not believe these things at all.  
     The obvious discomfort Tom and Shirley feel about the process of international surrogacy 
reveals their willingness to exploit others to pursue family creation. This is demonstrated by 
their self-rationalisation of what may well be poorly placed trust at the clinic level. While 
they hand over their own autonomy to the overseas clinic, they simultaneously use the 
autonomy of the third party surrogates and donors to justify their actions. In particular, they 
suggest they are giving autonomy to the surrogate, or providing them with autonomy. Tom 
said he was:   
…a bit concerned around ethical issues of surrogacy in developing countries that 
some women might go through and possible messy legal situations and human 
rights and all that jazz...I think for me as well, everyone generally benefited from 
it if it was a good situation…the women have certain rights and protections and 
the intending parents do as well. Then there is I guess the financial benefits and 
other benefits of a surrogate being able to carry a baby and the outcome for that in 
a developing country...they can buy a home or out their kids through school. So 
that’s a really, really good outcome, and we could get to have a baby. 
     In comparison, Tom said that he was ‘questioning the…motivations’ of Australian third 
party surrogates. Similarly, Shirley stated that: 
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I am not sure that our society is really well engineered for surrogacy here…I 
think it’s a little bit different in India…for any first world country I would want to 
know a bit more about the motives of a surrogate in America for example…At 
least in India its very – you know exactly what the motivation is. You know its 
money. You know they – the surrogate does not want to keep your baby. They do 
not want another mouth to feed.  
     Tom and Shirley’s accounts capture a double voiced discourse of autonomy. The traveller 
is simultaneously powerful and powerless, and they acknowledge that the surrogate may well 
be so too. On the one hand, travellers are aware of the line they cross between legality and 
illegality and wealth and poverty, and rationalise their decision by saying ‘[w]e’re not trying 
to work the system, we’re trying to create a family’ (Beth), or that ‘…there’s a part of me 
that’s outraged. How dare somebody – how dare anybody tell me that I can’t find a way to 
have a child’ (Isaac). On the other hand, the travellers put themselves at risk, and are victims 
of the global industry. As one interviewee, Rita, pithily puts it, ‘the experience has been fairly 
shattering’ and going to a foreign country is ‘terrifying’.  
 
3. Discussion 
The aim of this paper is to examine the application of the ethical principle of autonomy in the 
lived experience of individuals who have travelled for CBRC. This principle was explored 
across the three identity categories shared by the interview cohort: patient, consumer, and 
traveller. Across all three categories, the interviewees jointly and individually construct 
narratives which suggest a loss of control over their ability to stop medical treatment. All 
interviewees made autonomous choices to travel for CBRC, however their choices were 
influenced by access to technology, encouragement to use technology, and a feeling that they 
could not refuse treatment.   
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     This finding suggests that the practical application of the ethical principles of autonomy in 
travel for CBRC is contradictory. In choosing medical care, fertility clinics, and travel, the 
interviewees exercise autonomy. However, they are also confronted with a precarious 
situation where the promise of technology will clearly not be fulfilled if they stop treatment.  
This encourages them to keep trying, even when the avenues they undertake are expensive, 
painful and harmful, seemingly futile, and exploitative to others. This experience of recurring 
harm defies the more basic attributes of autonomy which, in Dworkin’s terms, include 
‘dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility and self-knowledge’, as well as 
‘critical reflection, with freedom from obligation, with absence of external causation, with 
knowledge of one’s own interests’ (Dworkin 1988: 127).  
      The contradiction arises in multiple ways:  
• First, individuals who cross borders garner risk of significant physical, psychological, 
emotional and economic cost, both for the traveller and third party surrogates and donors.  
However, it is also apparent that they have much to gain psychologically, economically 
and emotionally from travel for CBRC.  
• Second, the prioritisation of medicalised treatments for infertility masks the fact that 
travel for CBRC is necessarily a shared endeavour. For example, for gay men such as 
Tom, CRBC is the shared endeavour of the women who helped him – the egg donor and 
the surrogate – although these women disappear in the focus of infertility, as the 
infertility is Tom’s alone. Similar to Mendel’s (2007) argument concerning filial consent 
to medical treatment, more communitarian models may allow for consent to be owned by 
all with shared outcomes (Nedelsky 1989).  
• Third, while IVF is a medical procedure, it is also a process of socially determined choices 
(Conrad and Barker 2010; Pierret 2003). As Culley et al. (2009) assert, ‘[T]he most important 
decisions that people make—to define themselves as infertile, to seek treatment (or not), to 
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decide between forms of treatment, to consider adoption or other alternatives and so on—are 
all part of a fundamentally social process’. This explains the divergence between the social 
needs of infertile individuals to create a family, and the medical need to provide technology as 
the cure. Autonomy is compromised as the regulatory framework prioritises the treatment of 
the disease through technology, whereas for interviewees, the technology is secondary to the 
objective of family creation.  
Further, when the bioethical principle of autonomy is examined from a bottom up 
sociological perspective, we see how the interviewees live a different reality of infertility to 
that which is medically defined. Across all interviewees, infertility as an abstract construct. It 
shapes and directs their decision making, yet they each reject the medical terminology as a 
description. This may be an attempt to minimise harm, as for many women infertility is the 
most upsetting experience of their lives, and levels of depression and anxiety in infertile 
patients are comparable with those in cancer patients. The aversion to using medical 
terminology marks a divergence between the medicalisation of infertility, and the 
interviewees’ social reality (Lindemann 2018).   
     This finding of a contradictory application of autonomy departs from the findings of 
Couture et al. (2019) who determined, in one of the only empirical studies into Canadians 
travelling for CBRC, that ‘the problematic aspect of CBRC for users is the impression of 
being constrained to go abroad. In this perspective, CBRC without such constraint does not 
interfere with reproductive autonomy’ (Couture et al. 2019: 44). While recognising that 
constraints to travel impact autonomy, this study finds that the inability of infertile 
individuals to be offered or engage with plausible alternative means of family creation leads 
to a situation where autonomy is compromised. This leaves infertile individuals with neither 
effective treatment nor meaningful autonomy. Where trust is so critical and the industry so 
commercial, the potential for abuse is considerable.  
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     The mismatch between the autonomy expected of a patient who consents to treatment, and 
the experience of the interviewees being unable, in a Kantian sense, to ‘determine their own 
moral destiny’, suggests a need to shift this field of study. How this is to be done is the 
subject for future research. One possibility is to create a new research agenda around the 
application of complementary ethical principles to autonomy, specifically beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). To date, there are limited instances 
of these principles being applied to third party assisted reproduction. Two exceptions are the 
Principle of Procreative Beneficence (Savulescu and Kahane 2009) and reproductive justice 
in transnational surrogacy (Bailey 2011), and posthumous sperm (Lawson et al. 2016). 
Whereas autonomy respects the decision-making capacities of autonomous persons, the focus 
of beneficence is to provide benefits to the individual, and the focus of non-maleficence is to 
avoid causing harm. Both principles place the needs of the patient first. Additionally, justice 
is the obligation of fairness in the distribution of benefits and risks, which allows a balancing 
of the competing principles to take place. The principles can be used together to more easily 
form a considered judgement of how best to proceed.  
 
4. Conclusion   
Autonomy for travellers for CBRC is a principle of contradictory application. Infertile 
individuals who travel exercise autonomy, in that they are in charge of their own interests (de 
Lacey 2002). Indeed, the fact that they engage with a global reproductive industry 
demonstrates agency and choice. However, the interviews also highlight that a significant 
consequence of a diagnosis of infertility is constraint of reproductive choice. This limits the 
autonomy of an infertile person across their experiences as patient, consumer, and traveller.  
     This empirical bioethics inquiry sheds light on how infertility permeates the lives of 
individuals and how infertility – not the individual – is supported by the regulatory 
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framework. The framework medicalises infertility, which in turn shapes our understanding of 
infertility treatment as technology and science. Accordingly, to remain infertile is a decision, 
and to not attempt to cure it through technology is failure. Thus technology offers infertile 
individuals choice as well as no choice. Recognising the limits of autonomy in this field is 
one step towards reframing a more proportionate and responsive framework for the regulation 
of ART and related services. 
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